

# PEACE RESEARCHER

PEACE RESEARCHER'  
P.O. BOX 19683,  
CHRISTCHURCH

No. 9, 1986

## 'THE LIST'

Earlier this year PEACE RESEARCHER released to the media a listing of 30 significant military agreements binding New Zealand, the United States, Australia and other western nations. For the benefit of our readers, and for the record, we are publishing in this issue some of the most significant agreements, with descriptions.

PEACE RESEARCHER produced the list in response to prolonged delays by the Ministry of Defence in replying to requests for information and in order to make the public more fully aware of the multi-layers of defence agreements within ANZUS. Although our list is not definitive (there are more than a hundred agreements, memoranda of understanding, and working relationships linking the ANZUS partners), it includes many of the arrangements the New Zealand Ministry of Defence regards as 'secret'.

The arrangements include dividing up the oceans to track and keep under surveillance vessels of the Soviet Union in an integrated, world-wide, allied operation. They include making naval communications systems compatible for the purpose of integrated warfare and allocating military research and development projects.

It is hoped the list will be useful for discussions during the current debate over the future of New Zealand's defence and security policies. A full list is available on request by writing to PEACE RESEARCHER.

**INSIDE: \* AN UPDATE ON  
SIPLE STATION \* WHAT ASW  
AGREEMENT REALLY MEANS  
\* NEW RESOURCES**

## NOT ON THE LIST

The N.Z. Ministry of Defence is currently working on compiling a list of military agreements New Zealand has with its allies and expects to release the list to the public in the near future. The list, however, may be most interesting for its omissions.

A similar list was compiled by the Canadian Department of National Defence last year for a parliamentary committee studying the defence of North America. A list of 364 Canada/US military agreements was provided. But when it was compared to another list issued in 1980 there were a number of significant deletions. Amongst those deleted was the 1967 "Exchange of Notes on Conditions Under Which Storage of Nuclear Anti-Submarine Weapons in Canada, for Use of United States Forces, Would be Permitted."

This has particular relevance to New Zealand because Canada is involved too with the United States in an Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) agreement known as the Radford-Collins agreement. (See this issue and issue No. 5 of PEACE RESEARCHER). Under the agreement, Canada and New Zealand (as well as the United States and Australia) are responsible for keeping under surveillance a defined area of the Pacific ocean. It is an understanding of the agreement that New Zealand, in the event of full scale war, would have to rely heavily on United States assistance in the form of Anti-Submarine weaponry, as would Canada. Does this mean that New Zealand too shares on agreement with the United States under which nuclear depth charges, for instance, might be stored here in anticipation of an international crisis?

Amongst other titles deleted from Canada's list of 364 agreements and also of great interest are:

- \* An Exchange of Notes on Consultation Prior to the Release of Nuclear Weapons.
- \* An Agreement on the Storage of Nuclear Weapons.
- \* An Exchange of Notes on the Operation of United States Nuclear Powered Warships in Foreign Ports.

# THE LIST

by Keith Burgess.

## (1) THE TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGRAMME

The Technical Cooperation Programme (TTCP) is a cooperative research and development programme which involves Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States and the United Kingdom. The programme is said to be designed to promote a regular exchange of information and to foster collaboration in areas of defence science and technology. New Zealand was invited to join in 1969 and in 1970, without public announcement, became an active member of the Sub-committee on Non-Atomic Research and Development (NAMRAD). TTCP operates by forming Sub-Groups each of which covers a field of science related to defence. The current TTCP sub-Groups cover the following fields: Aeronautics, behavioural weapons, electronic warfare, infra-red and electro-optical sensors, materials, radar, and undersea warfare.

The New Zealand MoD says that because of our more limited scientific manpower resources and narrower range of interests, we are active only in selected Sub-Groups and have concentrated our efforts on undersea warfare, particularly on sonars in the maritime environment, materials, aeronautics and behavioural sciences.

New Zealand's work in undersea warfare has included a major joint experiment conducted with HMNZS Tui in the South Fiji basin in conjunction with the United States to explore the relationship between storms and the associated underwater noise which affects the performance of submarine detection systems.

Areas of concern: New Zealand became a committed member of TTCP without consultation with the New Zealand public or parliament, and no reference has been made to the programme in MoD annual reports or the 1983 Defence Review. New Zealand is contributing to research and development in anti-submarine warfare and is passing on achievements in the field 'without reservation' to a nuclear power. Survival of strategic submarines is well documented as being critical to continued, effective deterrence.

Copies of the 1982-1985 reports prepared by the TTCP Secretariat may be worth requesting. This has so far been denied under Section 6A & B of the Official Information Act.

## (2) THE ANZUS MARSAR AGREEMENT

The ANZUS MARSAR agreement is a combined ANZUS operational arrangement for cooperation in maritime surveillance. The details of the arrangement are classified and are not available for release either by the Government of New Zealand or Australia. However, the agreement is known to be concerned with the surveillance of ocean territory and commits all members of ANZUS to active participation. A 1982 briefing document prepared for the Select

Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control describes ANZUS MARSAR as a combined Australian, New Zealand and United States operational arrangement for co-operation in maritime surveillance. The document singles ANZUS MARSAR out as the only agreement directly associated with the ANZUS defence treaty and involving only the ANZUS partners. ANZUS MARSAR is an indication of how important maritime surveillance is to New Zealand's contribution to ANZUS.

## (3) AGREEMENT BETWEEN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN CHIEFS OF STAFF REGARDING A PLAN FOR COMBINED MARITIME SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS (1975).

Acknowledged to exist by the New Zealand Mod but classified under Sections 6 A & B of the Official Information Act.

## (4) THE RADFORD-COLLINS AGREEMENT

The Radford-Collins Agreement was originally signed by the United States and Australia in 1951 and provided for an agreed division of responsibilities for the surveillance and tracking of the Soviet fleet in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Under the agreement designated areas of these oceans were allocated to the Royal Australian and United States navies.

In 1978 the agreement was revised and a portion of the Pacific was sub-allocated to New Zealand. The Australian area of responsibility lies generally south of the equator between the mid-Pacific and the mid-Indian Oceans. The area east of this quadrangle (i.e. from about 170 East to 160 West) is the area assigned to New Zealand. The official description of Radford-Collins by the New Zealand MoD is that the agreement 'provides for the coordination of naval control and protection of shipping in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The parties to the agreement are the naval authorities in Australia, New Zealand, the United States of America and the United Kingdom. The Agreement requires consultation and mutual agreement prior to any combined operations.'

Under the Radford-Collins Agreement New Zealand is expected to maintain the necessary deployments and patrols to search this area in the South-West Pacific and to secure New Zealand's key air and naval support facilities and their approaches against the contingency of United States or allied use.

New Zealand carries out its responsibilities under the Radford-Collins Agreement by employing its Orion long range maritime patrol aircraft which are in the process of being modernised. These aircraft are based at RNZAF Base Auckland at Whenuapai but also operate out of minimally equipped bases in Fiji and the Cook Islands. They are being significantly upgraded with the installation of the Boeing Universal Display and Control Systems (UDCS), which is compatible with all sensors in use or under development for LRMP, ASW and weapon delivery systems. New Zealand frigates are also deployed to carry out the commitments and a High-Frequency Direction-Finding facility has been established at Tangimoana in the North Island for the purpose of picking up radio signals and locating their source. For ten days in

March 1982 a command post exercise (CPX) was staged by the United States and allies to test combined procedures under the Radford-Collins Agreement. The exercise was described as 'a world wide Naval Control of Shipping' exercise by the New Zealand MoD report for 1982. This was repeated in 1983 under the title Roll Call.

#### **(5) THE COMBINED EXERCISE AGREEMENT (COMBEXAG)**

An agreement which governs all exercises in which the 'Western' partners are associated.

Acknowledged to exist by the New Zealand MoD but classified under Sections 6 A & B of the Official Information Act.

#### **(6) THE COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS BOARD (CCEB)**

This is, according to the New Zealand MoD, a five nation joint Military Communications-Electronics Organisation whose mission is the coordination of any Military Communications - Electronics matter which is referred to it by a member nation. This includes the responsibility for the establishment of the content, format and release policy of Allied Communications Publications (ACPS) and general supplements thereto. The Board is composed of the heads of the individual nation joint Military Communications-Electronics Organisations. The member nations of the CCEB are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, The United Kingdom, and the United States.'

The organisation appears to have come about due to a common desire amongst the member nations to achieve a measure of communications interoperability between ships and aircraft of allied navies that operate together at sea on a regular basis. Under the auspices of the CCEB common procedures, books and fleet operational doctrines as well as common radio communications have been adopted. In addition, the United States and the United Kingdom, in particular, released high grade crypto-graphic systems for common use. Similarly, radio communications equipment fitted in ships of NATO and Commonwealth navies began to be an agreed standard.

New Zealand became a full member of the Combined Communications Electronics Board in September 1972.

#### **(7) THE NAVAL COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS ORGANISATION**

The Royal New Zealand Navy is a member of this organisation along with Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. The aim of the organisation, according to the New Zealand MoD, is 'to review the interoperability requirements in command, control and communications to satisfy AUS-CAN-NZ-UK-US operational concepts. This is achieved by reviewing areas of non-interoperability and their effect on US-CAN-NZ-UK-US naval operations and to recommend to higher national authorities courses of action to resolve such problems.'

This organisation is related to the CCEB and serves as a communications forum where interoperability problems can be identified, discussed and resolved.

New Zealand became a full member in 1980.

#### **(8) THE AIR STANDARDISATION COORDINATING COMMITTEE (ASCC)**

The ASCC originated in 1947 when it was agreed that the air forces of the United States, United Kingdom and Canada should have a capability to conduct combined operations. In addition, it was agreed that the air forces should be able to provide each other with certain essential services.

The original document of the ASCC read 'air forces would be able to fight together in certain theatres. In particular, it should be possible in the early stages of a future war for the air force of one country to be able to operate from the bases of another country before the arrival of their stores and equipment. This means that, as far as possible, the three airforces should be able to use each other's air fields and base organisations, communications, operational procedure, navigational aids, bombs and ammunition.'

The Royal New Zealand Airforce became a signatory to the agreement in 1965.

The objective of the ASCC is to achieve sufficient standardisation among the air forces of the ASCC nations to ensure that in the conduct of combined air operations there will be a minimum of operational material and technical obstacles to full cooperation and to enable essential support facilities and logistic support to be provided for aircraft of the other ASCC air forces. The attainment of the ASCC objectives is primarily achieved by the negotiation of formal agreements, known as air standards, among member nations.

These agreements which cover a wide field of operational and technical subjects include airborne electronics systems, aircraft armaments, air navigation and weapon direction and airfields and airfield facilities.

The New Zealand MoD is in the process of deciding what information relating to the ASCC can be released. Of particular interest, of course, are the agreements themselves and a 1981 study by the RAND Corporation of the ASCC commissioned by the USAF. Various reports of the Management Committee and Working Parties will also be of interest.

#### **(10) THE AIR TARGETING MATERIALS PROGRAMME**

The New Zealand MoD points out that any information on any form of targeting activity is classified under Sections 6A & B of the Official Information Act.

The MoD, however, acknowledges the existence of the agreement.

#### **(12) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON FLEET SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS, NEW ZEALAND - UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1982**

By 1982 the New Zealand defence establishment had decided to operationally deploy surface ships outfitted with ultra-high frequency (UHF) satellite communications Fleet Broadcast reception capabilities. Under this agreement the United States agreed to supply various defence articles and services, including

UHF satellite access support for RNZN utilisation. The agreement guaranteed one channel of the Indian Ocean and/or Pacific USN Fleet Satellite Broadcast would be allocated for allied use, but the agreement also stressed that this would be on a when available and not-to-interfere basis with USN Pacific and Indian Ocean Fleet operations.

#### **(14) THE UKUSA SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT**

The UKUSA (United Kingdom, United States, Australia) Agreement governs cooperation and exchange in signals intelligence (SIGINT). Described as quite likely the most secret agreement ever entered into by the English speaking world, it is so closely held that it has rarely been shown to Ministers of Defence or Prime Ministers. There is said to be only one copy in New Zealand and this rests with the Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department, as Chairman of the New Zealand Intelligence Council.

The New Zealand Ministry of Defence under Section 10 of the Official Information Act will neither confirm nor deny 'the existence or non-existence' of the UKUSA Agreement.

The UKUSA Agreement, which is in fact a series of agreements, exchanges of letters and memoranda of understanding, provides that the participating agencies standardise their terminology, code words, intercept handling procedures and indoctrination oaths for efficiency as well as security. It is a direct extension of the cooperation and exchange agreements established during the Second World War.

Membership of the secret UKUSA Agreement extends beyond the nations embodied in its acronym. It is in fact a five-powered, tiered agreement which establishes the United States as first party to the treaty and Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand as second parties.

In effect the agreement brings together under a single umbrella the SIGINT organisations of the five-powers -- namely the US National Security Agency (NSA), The UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Australia's Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), Canada's Communication Security Establishment (GSE), and New Zealand's Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB).

Under the agreement the five nations divided the earth into spheres of SIGINT collection responsibility, with each national SIGINT agency assigned specific targets according to its potential for maximum intercept coverage.

Concerns: The level of secrecy that surrounds the agreement and absence of public scrutiny, the hierarchical structure of the agreement with the United States as first party and all others as second and third parties, the amount of power afforded some individuals and agencies privy to certain information by the methods of exchange and compartmentalisation of intelligence, the reluctance of the United States as first party to pass on intelligence unless it is in the express interest of the United States, New Zealand's dependence upon the United States for intelligence which could result in the distortion of New Zealand's defence posture being vulnerable to misinformation.

#### **(15) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON LOGISTIC SUPPORT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF NEW ZEALAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1982)**

A controversial document, this agreement was announced by New Zealand and American defence officials as an extension of a 1965 pact which established the support New Zealand could expect to receive from the United States in peace time. This 1965 pact however contained no reciprocal logistic support articles and granted New Zealand assurance that logistic material and services for its armed forces would be obtained 'equivalent in timeliness and effectiveness to that provided United States armed forces'.

The 1982 Logistic Support Agreement contains significant provisions for the benefit of the United States. It commits New Zealand to provide repair facilities and supply bases for the United States military forces and, in fact, falls into a pattern of agreements established elsewhere in the world, officially termed Host Nation Support Agreements.

The agreement provides also for the 'pre-positioning' of United States weapons systems in New Zealand as well as 'munitions, ammunitions and other explosives' belonging to the United States.

#### **(27) POLICY GUIDELINES AGREEMENT FOR EXERCISES INVOLVING FORCES OF AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND THE UNITED STATES. (DECEMBER 1974 AND REVISED 1977)**

This agreement is acknowledged to exist by the New Zealand Ministry of Defence but remains classified under Sections 6A & B of the Official Information Act.

#### **(28) THE ABCA ARMIES PROGRAMME. (AUSTRALIAN, BRITISH, CANADIAN AND AMERICAN)**

This programme arose out of the close cooperation that existed between the major allies during World War II. The broad objective of the programme was to ensure that there would be no major equipment and technical obstacles to cooperations amongst the ABCA Armies and to obtain maximum economy from the use of combined resources and efforts.

New Zealand became an associate member in 1965. Central coordination of ABCA on-going work is carried out by the Primary Standardisation Office in the United States. At the working level of the ABCA Programme are the Quadripartite Working Groups (QWGs) each of which covers a functional area such as Armour, Infantry, Command and Control, Air Defence and Combat Development.

These groups meet from time to time to exchange information on current and future equipment and tactics and originate Quadripartite Standardisation Agreements (QSTAGS).

# THE ANTARCTIC SIPLE STATION – AMERICAN RESPONSE TO TRIDENT/ULF ALLEGATIONS

By Bob Leonard

The article in 'Peace Researcher' No. 8 entitled "A Whistle from Space to Trigger Trident" was responded to by two American workers at the Siple station on their return to civilisation in February. They stopped in at the Christchurch 'Star' to give their views on the allegations of military research made by the authors, Robert Aldridge and William Whistler. One of the Siple team, engineer Bill Trabucco, also spoke with 'Peace Researcher' about the topic just before departing for home in California.

The Siple workers do not deny the technical basis of the allegations in the 'Peace Researcher' article. Their main point of emphasis is that they believe the research is unlikely to lead to any practical communications system using pulsed VLF (very low frequency) signals. In other words the acknowledged interest of the US Navy in the research is essentially as alleged by Aldridge and Whistler.

Mr Trabucco has been involved in the work at Siple since the early 70's. He played an important role in adapting the 'surplus' Navy transmitter for use at Siple in 1978. That work included increasing the transmitting power from 100 kilowatts to approximately 150kW. That the Navy just happened to have an old transmitter to give to the Stanford research team rings a bit hollow. Aldridge notes in a recent letter to 'Peace Researcher' that these same two Siple workers, Evans Paschal and Trabucco, described the transmitter in the 'Antarctic Journal' (October 1978) as ". . . the only facility in the world capable of transmitting significant radio power at frequencies as low as 1 kilohertz."

In his letter, Aldridge went on to explain that the transmitter might logically have been installed by the Navy at its own research centre at Cutler, Maine, where ULF (ultra low frequency) experiments have been attempted. But it was installed at Siple instead because the Antarctic location is unique in the Southern Hemisphere for the desired research. "Thus, to maximize returns, the Navy could simply declare the transmitter surplus and give it to Siple station," said Mr Aldridge.


Bill Trabucco mentioned various types of low frequency experiments conducted at Siple. Some of these have included the VLF pulsing described by Aldridge and Whistler as a possible basis for Trident submarine communication, but the experiments have failed. Furthermore, he stated that the atmospheric

and magnetospheric conditions necessary for the experiments even to be attempted are rather rare. He also expected that nuclear explosions in space might disrupt ULF signals being transmitted at the outset of a nuclear conflict. This technical point would be relevant to conditions after the onset of a nuclear exchange, but would not invalidate the Aldridge thesis that the Siple VLF/ULF research might ultimately play a role in a US first strike.

'Peace Researcher' notes the sincere reassurances of Paschal and Trabucco that Siple is accommodating 'pure research' only. But we share the concerns of Robert Aldridge that "This delusion is the folly of many enthusiastic engineers and scientists connected with universities. Military departments don't support any project unless it has military value and many military programs are disguised as 'pure research', or 'basic research', under the administration of so-called civilian agencies." At Siple the principal agencies are the National Science Foundation and Stanford University.

In his discussion with 'Peace Researcher', Mr Trabucco suggested that the Siple station might be forced to close within about two years because of the relentless crushing of buildings by ice. Nevertheless, he anticipated more work would be done in the 1986-87 summer season and that it might well include continued extension of the second of the 21 km long horizontal antennae to 42 km. That work could not be completed this past season although the construction moneys have already been paid to the private contractor.

Siple station was reopened in the summer of 1985/86 after a two year closure due to lack of funding. Research will continue over the coming winter with a small scientific staff. Winter is the most productive season for research at Siple. An important question would seem to be, what is the future of Siple station? If it closes soon our major concerns will end. If it does not close, its continued operation will probably require substantial new funding and facilities. Those new activities would be probed and reported by researchers in New Zealand and the U.S.



## BAITING THE BEAR

### THREATS TO THE SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET

by Dennis Small

The growth of the Soviet Navy under Admiral Gorshkov is considered to be one of the major strategic developments since World War II. Being the most visible expression of Soviet power it is often represented as the most dramatic example of the Soviet Threat to the West. But today the greater part of the Soviet Navy still consists of surface warships and submarines with limited capabilities to operate on the open ocean, let alone to challenge Western dominance of the high seas. (1) A comparison in 1982 of US/USSR naval system technology level by the U.S. Department of Defence assessed the U.S.S.R. as superior only in one category – mine warfare. (2) In all others, the U.S.S.R. continues to lag well behind the U.S.

While legitimate concern should focus on the future development of the Soviet Navy and its possible expansion in the direction of a global interventionary rather than a self-defence capability, it is clear that the U.S.S.R.'s current naval forces are severely limited in their power projection by a combination of factors. This situation will exist well into the foreseeable future.

In the following discussion emphasis is placed on the Pacific and to some extent Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) in that region. The convergence of geographical and technological vulnerability in the case of the Soviet Pacific Fleet is also generally applicable to those other regions where the Soviet Navy operates. Today, the Pacific is becoming especially significant as an area of super-power rivalry and a potential battleground. (3) This region is increasingly subject to the process of nuclear militarisation. It is also the focus of a U.S. propaganda campaign to keep N.Z. and other nations within the nuclear fold.

#### Constraints

Those critical of American-led propaganda, which continually alleges a Soviet threat to the Western Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC), have rightly made much of the geographical constraints on the Soviet Navy. Not only do the Soviets have to divide their Navy into four separate fleets – the Pacific, Northern, Baltic and Black Sea Fleets – but these fleets all need to navigate narrow channels before reaching the main oceans. "The U.S. and its allies could close these channels using mines and numerous anti-submarine planes, ships and submarines." (4)

As Dr Patrick J. Garrity points out, there has been a continuing search by Russia, a traditionally land-based power, for a strategic perimeter and this search has taken the form of a naval push outwards from the Eurasian continent. (5) This strategic perimeter broadly parallels the line of Soviet blue water access. Protection of the Russian coastline and of the ballistic missile submarine fleet (SSBN's) remains the principal tasks of the Soviet Navy. (1)

#### Soviet Objectives

The question of Soviet naval expansionism can be resolved into two basic questions – (a) what are Soviet objectives? and, (b) how capable are the

---

"Today, the Pacific is becoming especially significant as an area of super-power rivalry and a potential battleground . . . it is also the focus of a U.S. propaganda campaign to keep N.Z. and other nations within the nuclear fold."

---

Russians of achieving these objectives? Some conservative analysts allow their biases to constantly confound their answers to these questions. They emphasise the threat as they see it of ultimate Soviet world domination in contradiction to some of the very facts they marshal in support of their thesis. For instance, while warning of Soviet aggression, Garrity notes that the Soviet objective must be to prevent an effective alliance among China, Japan and the U.S. (5) Is this objective basically defensive or offensive? When Garrity refers to the Soviet desire to restructure a balance of power which has favoured the U.S. since 1945, he understates the problems now faced by the U.S.S.R. in that he ignores the greatest post-World War II restructuring of the balance of power in the Far East – the Sino-Soviet split and subsequent Sino-American co-operation. This Soviet setback obviously induced much of its big military build up during the seventies. Ninety percent of the greatly increased Soviet ground forces in the Far East are directed against China and its "growing nuclear capability". (3) Garrity himself admits that the Soviet defensive perimeter "from Aden to the Kuriles is tenuous at best."

#### Analysts


Dr Dora Alves, touted as "one of the few writers of the day on maritime strategy", is another who offers a confused interpretation of Soviet intentions and capabilities. (6) She emphasises the Soviet potential to interdict SLOC yet recognises that recent Soviet submarine activity in the Pacific may be "to counter growing US-Chinese co-operation, which must appear threatening." At the same time, she says that Western and allied SLOC will become even more valuable, and tempting targets given this co-operation. As if the Soviets would rationally risk the consequences of interdicting SLOC when such actions would inevitably elicit not only massive joint retaliation but very probably trigger a global holocaust. Alves's fantasies even run to the effect that the U.S.S.R. wants to control Australia's minerals – about as remote a practicable possibility as can be imagined.

Analyst Paul Dibb, a senior research fellow in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University and a former deputy director of the Joint Intelligence Organisation in the Australian Department of Defence, rightly emphasises the Russian perception of the threat from the "growing relationship between China, the U.S. and Japan." In a crisis Soviet forces would face an enormous array of enemy firepower and only a relatively few, largely obsolescent submarines would be available for "the interdiction of ports and SLOC in the entire Pacific and Indian Oceans". (7)



The drawing at right and photo below are from the US Government publication 'Soviet Military Power 1985'. The Pentagon stresses the size of the Russian Typhoon-Class SSBN. In fact the Typhoon's size makes it vulnerable to tracking by US ASW forces.

Greater size than the US Trident but less firepower and greater vulnerability.



### Conflict Potential

Sometimes those who believe there is a serious Soviet threat to our sealanes even indirectly acknowledge the absurdity of their own position. Captain John Moore, editor of 'Jane's Fighting Ships', aptly states: "The forms of maritime conflict are so varied that the chances of an escalatory process are probably higher at sea than elsewhere". (8) Yet the Americans themselves are escalating the conflict potential at sea. With the current U.S. policy of aggressive and unpredictable maritime manoeuvres, especially in the Northern Pacific — the one border where Soviet and U.S. forces directly confront each other — the risks of accidental war involving the superpowers have multiplied frighteningly. (9) Former U.S. Pacific Commander, Admiral Robert Long, has stated that the Asia/Pacific region "is most probably where we shall witness confrontation with the Soviet Union." (10) Similarly, in 1983 the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Sylvester Foley, warned of potential conflict in the South China Sea. (11)

### Cam Ranh Bay

The Western SLOC scare stems from a calculated propaganda strategy on the part of the U.S. Navy. (12) At present, in the Pacific it takes its most concrete form with respect to the Soviet deployment at Cam Ranh Bay. According to an article in Jane's

Defence Weekly: "The fact that the Soviets now have Cam Ranh Bay means that the life-line of the West in the South China Sea will be permanently threatened by the Bear's Claw." (13) Such concern has been faithfully echoed by our own Ministry of Defence. (14)

In the Jane's Defence Weekly article cited above, 'the Cam Ranh Bay base is variously described as a threat to the SLOC, the U.S. bases in the Philippines, to China and to Japan. Yet with these potential enemies and others pressing so close in on it, the Soviet Union is virtually pressured into breaking out through what it must realistically see as an encircling hostile alliance. Significantly, the Soviet Union was first given regular access to bases in Vietnam in 1979 after China attacked Northern Vietnam in reprisal for Hanoi's invasion of Kampuchea. And Hanoi's invasion was in response to Khmer Rouge attacks.

The Western militarist ploy is either to suggest threats to individual countries or to suggest a vague generalised threat and to ignore the fact that any serious maritime engagement would inevitably initiate a chain reaction involving all the powers in the region. In its confused way the 'Jane's' article itself actually acknowledges that the Russians could not cope with the Americans alone. It states that even if the U.S.S.R. were to permanently deploy an aircraft carrier battle

8 group at Cam Ranh Bay, "it could not cope with the mighty power of the U.S. carrier battle group." Furthermore the article also recognises that the base "needs continuous supply from Vladivostock to maintain its effectiveness as a forward base". Obviously, this supply line — let alone the critical sea supply line from European Russia to Vladivostock itself — is very vulnerable to interdiction by the West and its Far Eastern/Pacific allies. Once again we see how Western militarist analyses so often use facts which contradict their own scare-mongering. In late 1984 Admiral Crowe, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific admitted that the Soviet military presence at Cam Ranh Bay was "modest" (15) and we have already noted the base's vulnerability even if substantially reinforced.

### Superior Forces

Soviet submarines present the most obvious possible threat to Western SLOC. The Soviet Pacific submarine fleet numbers 134 out of a total submarine fleet of about 460 boats, of which 371 are currently operational. (16) But it is, in fact, clear that the Soviet aggression would be suicidal in the face of superior submarine and ASW forces. One analysis of regional maritime forces gives 108 USSR submarines against a total of 168 for the U.S. and its allies, including China. (7). Another analysis, using figures based on somewhat different criteria and mostly extracted from a table by G. Jacobs (17) gives 134 Russian submarines versus 194 American and other clearly hostile submarines. Most importantly, as Jacobs indicates, the Soviet Union has far more problems in dealing with ASW in the Pacific and Indian Oceans than do the Western powers in these regions.

Indeed, the Soviets would be quite unable to effectively defend their own open-ocean trade owing to an insufficient number of platforms (both surface and airborne) as well as a lack of up-to-date ASW systems. A high percentage of the Soviet Pacific Fleet's destroyers and frigates are only equipped with the older generation of ASW sensors. (17) Again, about half the Russian "major surface combatants are gun frigates of the Riga, Petya and Grisha classes which have limited sea-keeping capabilities", restricting Russian open ocean ASW deployment. (7)

As well as the U.S. fleet, the Soviets would also need to deal with allied enemy surface forces. Including China and Japan, these countries are Canada, Australia, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, France, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. Their forces have a combined total of over 90 active destroyers and 70 frigates in the Pacific/Indian Ocean region. (18)

In a comparison of the U.S. and Russian Pacific Fleets, the N.Z. External Intelligence Bureau crudely presented last year as its main finding the conclusion that, allowing for some exceptions, "the numerical balance of forces in various other categories has been turning against U.S. forces." (19) Not only does this judgement ignore the maritime forces allied to the Americans, whether formally or de facto, but it ignores the Bureau's own categorisation of the figures used in its analytical breakdown of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. For instance, of the 90 major U.S.S.R. surface ships listed by the Bureau, 61 per cent are frigates, the smallest type, compared with only 43 per cent of

---

**"The Soviet Pacific fleet is bigger than that of the U.S. because its size is inflated by hundreds of patrol craft, mine-sweepers and old, noisy, diesel-electric submarines which are useful only for local defence."**

---

the 105 U.S. ships. It is not just that the major U.S. surface ships are mostly of the larger types; typically, American aircraft-carriers, cruisers, destroyers and frigates are about twice as big as their Soviet counterparts. (20) Correspondingly, they pack far more firepower. "The Soviet Pacific Fleet is bigger than that of the U.S. because its size is inflated by hundreds of patrol craft, mine-sweepers and old, noisy, diesel-electric submarines which are useful only for local defence." (20)

### Submarine Surveillance

Soviet style submarine surveillance emphasises a rigid pattern of "vectoring the 'operational tactical' submarines toward enemy ships on the open ocean." (21) This acute dependence on land-based Soviet command, control and communications and intelligence systems (C<sup>3</sup>I) "seems practicable only if submarines are to be employed relatively close to home waters". It renders the Soviet submarine warfare capacity very vulnerable to the newly deployed American Tomahawk cruise missile. (10) This vulnerability is further increased by Soviet reliance on radio communications and their likely interception by the U.S. Naval Ocean Surveillance Information System which incorporates a network of around 40 to 50 high-frequency direction-finding stations within the Indo-Pacific sub-system, including the N.Z. facility at Tangimoana. (22)

In its Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy assessment, the Australian Government fairly stated of the Pacific that "the much superior U.S. forces in the region could be expected promptly to neutralise Soviet forces." (23) Nevertheless, the U.S. buildup continues. In particular, modernisation of the already dominant U.S. A.S.W. systems is proceeding apace.

The latest addition — and a highly significant one — is what is known as LAMPS III or Light Air-borne Multipurpose System for which the SH-60 Seahawk helicopter is the new seagoing platform (24). LAMPS III represents a huge advance in co-ordinates sensing and processing ASW combat systems. More frigates, destroyers, cruisers and amphibious ships are being equipped to take LAMPS III helicopters. "The LAMPS III ship will be able to effectively search for submarines over 30,000 square miles of ocean. One Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class frigate will be able to exert an influence over as much ocean as 20 or more predecessors." (24) The first operational deployment of this system occurred when the guided-missile frigate, USS Crommelin, came to the West Pacific in February 1985. (25)

A new Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) is also being deployed. Together with existing systems like the extensive U.S. Sonar Surveillance System (SOSUS), the new innovations will enable America to move closer to a first strike goal in the Pacific with the theoretical possibility of eliminating the Soviet submarine fleet. (26) (22)




### "The First Five Minutes of War"

The U.S. Pacific Command has a new aggressive posture, its "Full Forward Pressure Maritime Strategy", which directly threatens the Soviet SSBN's sheltering in the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk. (1) (3) U.S. Navy Secretary, John Lehman, has stated that U.S. attack submarines would go after Soviet SSBN's "in the first five minutes of the war". The strategy would be supported by all the rest of the U.S. Anti-submarine Warfare systems. Recent press reports have highlighted this strategy. (28) Thus the Soviets are now even finding their SSBN sanctuaries under threat; SSBN survivability is essential for the Soviets as "a hedge against surprise attack" and so as a means of ensuring a survivable deterrent force.

Currently, Soviet efforts to hide their SSBN's under the Arctic ice are being countered by a whole range of U.S. measures to locate these boats. Leading peace researcher, Robert Aldridge, considers that the U.S. already has virtually a first strike ASW capability. (29)

The U.S. is upgrading its naval forces for nuclear war — "nuclear survivable" C<sup>31</sup>, radiation/electromagnetic pulse toughened ships, and even a Tomahawk cruise missile reserve for a so-called World War IV. (3) (30).

The Soviets may be treating the Pacific as "an area for a holding campaign" if war broke out, while directing their primary effort in Europe. (18) The Soviet Navy would be a formidable defensive force along its Pacific coastal region. (1) U.S. Naval dominance in the rest of the Pacific in both conventional and nuclear terms is well documented. Thus the real threat to peace in the Pacific is not Soviet Naval expansion but the U.S. policy of overt provocation on the high seas that just might result in a conventional confrontation going rapidly nuclear.



(12) Klare, M.T. "Beyond the Vietnam Syndrome: U.S. Interventionism in the 1980s", I.P.S., Washington D.C. 1981.

(13) Jane's Defence Weekly, July 21, 1984, p.66.

(14) 'The Press', October 22, 1984.

(15) Pacific Defense Reporter October 1984, p.39.

(16) The Christian Science Monitor, June 22-28, 1985. APDF, Fall 1985.

(17) For the original table see Jacobs, G. "Russia's Pacific ASW Problems", in PDR, May 1984.

(18) Figures based on 'Jane's Fighting Ships: 1985-1986'.

(19) Disarmament and Arms Control: Report of The Select Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence 1985, p.55.

(20) Winsley, P. "The Soviet Pacific Fleet", Peace and Justice Forum, Wellington Labour Regional Council, P O Box 2851, Wellington. Excellent paper!

(21) Vego, Dr M. "Submarine Surveillance Soviet Style", J.D.W., July 28, 1984, pp 117-121.

(22) See Peace Researcher, No. 6, 1984.

(23) 'The National Times', March 30-April 5, 1984.

(NZNFZC, No. 4-15).

(24) Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, Summer 1984.

(25) Pacific Defense Reporter, December 1985/January 1986, p. 28).

(26) Cole, M. "Pacific First Strike", Chain Reaction, No. 29, Spring 1982.

(27) In 1982 the Centre for Defence Information pointed out that the Soviets had 100 submarines less than they had had 10 years earlier. T.D.M. vol XI, No. 6, 1982.

(28) For example, 'The Star', January 9, 1986.

(29) Aldridge, R.C. "Background Paper on Soviet Submarine Vulnerability", December 30, 1984. (NZNFZC, No. 7-31).

(30) Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, Fall, 1985.

### REFERENCES & NOTES

- (1) "The Soviet Navy - Still Second Best", The Defence Monitor, vol XIV, No. 7, Centre For Defence Information, Washington C.D. 1985. (Catalogue item No 7-33, New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Committee, P O Box 18-541 Christchurch).
- (2) World Armaments and Disarmaments, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook, 1984, p. 92.
- (3) Arkin, W & Fieldhouse, R. "The Pacific", ch.7 in 'Nuclear Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race', Ballinger Pub. Co., Institute For Policy Studies, Washington D.C., 1985.
- (4) "US-Soviet Military Facts", T.D.M., vol XIII, No. 6, 1984 (NZNFZC No 6-16).
- (5) Garrity, Dr P.J. "Soviet Policy in the Far East", Asia-Pacific Defence Forum, Summer 1983.
- (6) Alves, Dr D. "The Submarine's Role in Soviet Pacific Strategy", Pacific Defence Reporter, September 1984.
- (7) Dibb, P. "The Soviet Union as a Pacific Military Power", P.D.R., November 1984.
- (8) Bidwell, S.ed. "World War 3", Rev. Ed., Hamlyn Paperbacks, 1980, p. 153.
- (9) In recent years press reports have regularly described the new dangerous policies and exercises.
- (10) Quoted in MacLellan, N. "Pacific Cruise", Peace Studies, No. 4, July 1984.
- (11) 'The Press' July 16, 1983.

# REVELATIONS ON US/NZ ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AGREEMENTS


'PEACE RESEARCHER' has obtained new information relating to the provisions of two important US/NZ agreements on combined Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) operations. These agreements are Radford-Collins and ANZUS MARSAR and are regarded by the New Zealand Government as extremely sensitive arrangements.

The Ministry of Defence has on past occasions called on Section 6A & B of the Official Information Act in refusing to release details of the Agreements. Descriptions of the general significance of both Agreements are provided in 'THE LIST' in this issue of 'PEACE RESEARCHER'.

New information relating to the provisions of Radford-Collins and ANZUS MARSAR are:

- \* In the event of Radford-Collins and ANZUS MARSAR Agreements being invoked, New Zealand would be expected to maintain 'operational control' of its defined area of responsibility, but not 'overall command'.
- \* New Zealand would be expected, under the terms of the Agreements, to keep key air facilities and naval support facilities open for the use of allied forces. As a follow on to this provision, New Zealand would expect to receive automatic assistance, most likely in the form of Anti-Submarine Warfare weaponry, possibly even nuclear depth charges. This provision was made in recognition of New Zealand's limited ASW capabilities in comparison to her allies.

- \* Canada is also party to these Agreements. Canada struck up a secret 1967 pact with the United States allowing under certain conditions storage of US ASW nuclear weapons on Canadian soil.
- \* New Zealand's area of maritime responsibility as defined by these Agreements measures 7 million square miles, covering the area precisely displayed on the map below.




---

## Navy in a Nonnuclear War Might Hit A-Subs

*New York Times,*

WASHINGTON, Jan. 6 — The Navy has officially acknowledged that in the event of a major nonnuclear conflict broke out between the United States and the Soviet Union, it might seek to attack Soviet submarines that carry long-range nuclear missiles.

The contemplated action, using conventional weapons, would be intended to tip the nuclear balance in favor of the United States and induce the Soviet Union to end the conflict on terms favorable to American forces, according to the Navy.

In the past, some senior Navy officials have declined to commit themselves publicly to such a strategy. In an interview in November, the Secretary of the Navy, John F. Lehman Jr., said it was "not necessarily" United States strategy to attack Soviet strategic submarines in a nonnuclear

### Policy Has Critics

Some critics have said that Navy attacks using conventional weapons against Soviet submarines carrying long-range nuclear missiles would put pressure on the Soviet Union to use nuclear weapons in response and would increase the risk that a conventional conflict would turn into a nuclear war.

The acknowledgment that this element was in a recent article by Adm. James D. Watkins, who as Chief of Naval Operations on the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the Navy's highest officer. Navy officials said today that they had decided, after careful deliberation, to outline the strategy publicly to rebut criticism that the service lacks a clear vision of how to fight a naval war.

The officials said the article by Admiral Watkins did not signal a new strategy but was the most explicit articulation of Navy thinking on the issue. Navy officials said the article had been submitted to Defense Secretary Caspar

W. Weinberger's office for clearance before publication.

In the article, "The Maritime Strategy," published by the United States Naval Institute, Admiral Watkins noted the potential for using Navy forces to "alter the nuclear equation" in favor of the United States by using conventional weapons.

This, he said, could be done by "destroying Soviet ballistic missile submarines" and by deploying United States aircraft carriers and other vessels that carry nuclear weapons "around the periphery of the Soviet Union."

Admiral Watkins wrote that the strategy "is not without risk" and that "neither we nor the Soviets can rule out the possibility that escalation will occur."

But, he adds, "Escalation solely as a result of actions at sea seems improbable given the Soviet land orientation."

One critic of the strategy, Barry R. Posen, an assistant professor at Princeton University, who formerly

worked in the Defense Department, called the strategy unduly provocative.

"We are being asked to spend billions of dollars to buy ammunition and modernize our conventional weapons in order to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe and reduce the risk of nuclear escalation there," he said. "And here the U.S. Navy has selected a strategy that works diametrically in the opposite direction

"Of all the possible Navy strategies," he said, "this one is the most likely to cause the other side to reach for nuclear weapons."

A naval expert said there was still debate within the Navy over the wisdom of the strategy and the decision to advertise it.

"Strategic submarines are the Soviet Union's strategic reserve force," the naval expert said. "If we start killing

their strategic submarines, they may go after our aircraft carriers with nuclear weapons. If anything, this strategy will promote escalation."

A Defense Department official, however, defended the Navy strategy. He said the Navy was not saying it would seek to destroy the entire Soviet strategic submarine force in a conventional conflict. He also argued that Soviet military writings suggested that United States strategic submarines could be the target of a Soviet attack in the early stages of a war.

In recent years, there has been growing interest in the Navy in developing the ability to attack Soviet strategic submarines.

The Navy, for instance, has taken steps to improve its ability to operate under the Arctic ice, where it is thought Soviet strategic submarines would try to hide

Last April, Admiral Watkins went to a Navy base in the Arctic and visited a Navy attack submarine that surfaced through the ice, a Navy official said.

Admiral Watkins later spoke about the trip in an interview with reporters. "An effort was made to make sure that the word got out about the trip," a Navy official said, in order to send a signal to the Soviet Union about the Navy's intention to improve "deterrence" by adding to its ability to operate in polar regions.

The Navy has conducted tests of sonar and torpedoes in Arctic regions in recent years, military experts said. The Navy is also trying to give some of its Los Angeles-class submarines more ability to operate under the ice and plans to develop a new attack submarine, the SSN-21, that is more effective than existing submarines in Arctic regions.

## NEW RESOURCES

\* 'NAVAL POWER IN THE PACIFIC, AMERICA'S SEARCH FOR ALLIES', Dr Geoffrey Till, Armed Forces Journal, An Assessment of the naval role of allies in the Pacific (China & Japan), 5 pages.

\* Articles on secret US-UK arrangements giving priority to American military requirements in wartime, including requisitioning of land around military bases, civil airports, transport resources and impressed civilian labour to be made available to US forces.

'Secret Laws for Wartime Britain', and 'If War Came Close We Would Have New Masters', Duncan Campbell and Patrick Forbes in the New Statesman, September 1985, both 3 pages.

\* 'New Zealand's Dilemma', Thomas-Durell Young in US Naval Proceedings, August 1985. Contains further insights into New Zealand's ASW activities and responsibilities in the Pacific and how this has directed Government policy including training and equipment of our Armed Forces. 6 pages.

\* 'Briefing Papers' provided to the New Zealand Select Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control (c. 1982), 17 pages.

\* 'Communicating with Submarines' Jane's Defence Weekly, an article on the importance of Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) communications 'particularly useful . . . throughout the spectrum of limited nuclear operations and in a nuclear or non-nuclear war at sea'. 5 pages.

The above resources are available by writing to 'Peace Researcher', P.O. Box 19683, Christchurch. Charges: 10c per page plus postage.

